The Whole Thing in 5 Lines
Before you read anything else, understand this:
- At least a dozen African governments are building brand-new cities — not expanding old ones but constructing entire capitals, financial districts, and smart cities from bare land. Egypt, Ethiopia, Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya are all doing versions of this.
- The stated reasons are consistent: old capitals are overcrowded, ungovernable, and built for colonial-era populations. The new cities are meant to signal modernity, attract investment, and restructure governance.
- The financing is often Chinese, and the architecture is frequently Chinese-designed — which has created real questions about debt leverage, strategic positioning, and who actually controls new critical infrastructure.
- Most of these cities are being built without significant input from the populations they will house. The people who currently live on the chosen land are often displaced. The citizens who will theoretically benefit are rarely consulted.
- Whether these cities succeed or become expensive ghost towns depends on whether they solve real problems — congestion, housing, economic opportunity — or are primarily monuments to state ambition.
Historical Background
Why Old African Capitals Are Breaking Down
Lagos is home to somewhere between 16 and 27 million people depending on whether you measure the city proper or the wider metropolitan area — a range that itself reflects how difficult it is to count a city growing faster than its administrative boundaries. A 2023 World Bank diagnostic report put the population at 13–27 million with an annual growth rate of 3.2%. Its road network, water supply, and drainage systems were designed for a city a fraction of that size. Cairo has roughly 22 million residents in its metropolitan area and has been expanding uncontrollably into agricultural land along the Nile for decades. Nairobi has informal settlements housing nearly half its population without formal water or sanitation connections. Kinshasa, Dar es Salaam, Abidjan — the pattern holds.
This is not a failure of African cities in isolation. It is the consequence of a specific historical trajectory. Colonial administrations built their administrative centres for one purpose: to extract resources and administer a subject population. They were not designed for democratic governance, mass housing, or industrial economies. When independence came in the 1950s and 60s, most countries inherited capitals built for a few hundred thousand people and then watched those capitals absorb rural migration at speeds the infrastructure could not keep pace with.
"Africa's urbanisation challenge is not that its cities are too African. It is that they were built for someone else's purposes and have been absorbing the consequences of that design ever since."
The demographic pressure is also accelerating. Africa is the only major world region where the urban population is still growing rapidly. By 2050, the UN projects Africa's urban population will roughly double — from around 700 million to over 1.5 billion. The existing cities simply cannot absorb that growth without fundamental restructuring. Building new cities is, in that context, not a vanity project but a genuine response to a structural problem.
The question is not whether new urban capacity is needed. It clearly is. The question is whether building brand-new cities from scratch is the right solution — and whether the specific ways they are being built serve the populations they claim to.
The New Megacity Wave — Key Milestones
1991
Nigeria moves its capital from Lagos to Abuja — the original African new capital project. Abuja becomes the model, for better and worse, that later projects reference.
2006
Egypt announces plans for a new administrative capital east of Cairo. Planning stalls repeatedly but construction eventually begins in earnest around 2016.
2015–2016
Multiple new city projects announced across the continent: Diamniadio (Senegal), Eko Atlantic (Nigeria), Konza Technopolis (Kenya), Hope City (Ghana), Tatu City (Kenya).
2019–2021
Egypt's New Administrative Capital receives its first residents and government ministries begin moving in. Construction pace accelerates with Chinese investment.
2022–2024
Several projects stall due to debt concerns, cost overruns, and lack of organic uptake. Ethiopia's Hawassa Industrial Park model attracts attention as an alternative approach — building around existing economic activity rather than political ambition.
The Cities Being Built
A Closer Look at the Major Projects
These are not all the same kind of project. Some are full capital relocations. Some are satellite cities. Some are privately-developed special economic zones. Understanding the differences matters for assessing what they can and cannot achieve.
New Administrative Capital
Egypt
Est. cost~$58 billion (total est.)
Target population6.5 million
Primary funderEgypt + China CSCEC
45 km east of Cairo. Government ministries have begun relocating. Includes Africa's tallest tower (by Egyptian state claims), a presidential palace, and an embassy district. Largely empty residential zones as of 2024. Built partly by China State Construction Engineering Corporation.
Diamniadio
Senegal
Distance from Dakar~30 km
StatusPartially populated
ModelGovernment-led satellite
Presented as a decongestion strategy for Dakar. Some government offices have relocated. A new international airport opened nearby. Mixed outcomes — some economic activity but concerns about who can afford to live there remain persistent.
Eko Atlantic
Nigeria (Lagos)
LocationReclaimed ocean land
ModelPrivate-sector luxury
TargetFinancial hub
Built on land reclaimed from the Atlantic Ocean. Explicitly designed as an elite financial and residential district. Widely criticised as a city for the wealthy in a country where 40% of the population lives below the national poverty line. Slow uptake continues.
Konza Technopolis
Kenya
Distance from Nairobi~60 km
Tagline"Silicon Savannah"
StatusSignificantly delayed
Announced in 2008 as a technology hub. Has struggled to attract the tech investment required to give it economic purpose. Infrastructure is partially built but organic business uptake has been slower than projections assumed. A cautionary case about building supply without confirmed demand.
Tatu City
Kenya (Nairobi region)
DeveloperRendeavour (private)
ModelMixed private/municipal
StatusActive construction
A privately developed city north of Nairobi with a special economic zone framework. One of the more commercially active projects on the continent — factories, schools, and residential zones are operational. Different model from state-led projects: driven by investor returns rather than political symbolism.
Hawassa Industrial Park
Ethiopia
Built byCCECC (Chinese SOE)
ModelIndustrial SEZ
StatusOperational, mixed results
Not a new capital but an industrial zone built to anchor job creation around an existing town. Textile and apparel manufacturing. Created jobs — but also created a Chinese-built, Chinese-managed enclave with limited technology transfer to Ethiopian workers. A model for what development can look like, with the same tensions writ smaller.
⚡ Reality Check — Are Any of These Cities Actually Working?
The honest answer is: a few are partially working, most are behind schedule, and several look like expensive mistakes so far.
Success is not binary. Egypt's New Administrative Capital has government presence but is largely residential desert. Diamniadio has some activity but is not the thriving satellite city it was marketed as. Tatu City and Hawassa are generating actual economic activity. Konza is a near-cautionary tale. The key variable that separates the functioning projects from the empty ones is whether economic activity was confirmed before construction or assumed to follow from it. Cities are ecosystems, not monuments — they require organic network effects, agglomeration of businesses, and access to labour markets to function. You cannot mandate that into existence by building roads and towers.
Infrastructure, Finance and Power
The China Question — and Why It Is More Complicated Than It Looks
China's role in African infrastructure is both real and frequently mischaracterised. The simple narrative — China builds things, Africa goes into debt, China gains strategic leverage — captures something true while missing significant nuance.
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their financing arms have built an extraordinary amount of African infrastructure since the early 2000s: roads, railways, ports, stadiums, government buildings, and now entire cities. The scale is genuinely unprecedented. China Exim Bank and China Development Bank have been the primary lenders for many of these projects, often at terms that are more flexible than Western multilateral lenders but with significant conditions attached around the use of Chinese contractors and Chinese labour.
The Debt Leverage Question
Is China using debt to gain strategic control of African infrastructure?
The "debt trap diplomacy" narrative — that China deliberately lends African nations more than they can repay, then claims strategic assets when they default — has been widely circulated. The evidence for it is more complicated. Zambia's debt situation with China attracted significant attention, but close analysis by researchers including Deborah Brautigam at Johns Hopkins found that the actual mechanics of Chinese debt in Africa rarely involve the kind of asset seizure that the narrative implies. That said, the dependency created by Chinese financing — on Chinese contractors, Chinese technology systems, and Chinese goodwill for refinancing — is a real form of leverage that does not require formal asset seizure to have geopolitical significance. Both the alarmist version and the dismissive version are wrong.
Who Is Actually Building These Cities
China SOEs
China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) built Egypt's New Administrative Capital tower district. Chinese firms built Hawassa. Multiple Chinese SOEs are active across the continent in roads, railways, and now city-scale projects. They bring financing, speed, and integrated supply chains — and they bring Chinese workers, Chinese materials, and limited technology transfer.
Gulf States
UAE and Saudi Arabia are increasing infrastructure investment in East and North Africa. Abu Dhabi's ADQ and Mubadala are active. Different model from China — more equity-based, less debt-based, more focused on agricultural land access and logistics corridors than prestige architecture.
Private Developers
South African, UK, and US-linked private developers — like Rendeavour (Tatu City) — are building commercially-driven urban projects under special economic zone frameworks. Market-dependent but less politically entangled. More likely to produce functional districts; less likely to produce equitable housing.
African Govts
State-driven projects — Egypt, Senegal, Nigeria's Abuja expansion — set the political agenda and choose the sites, but rarely have the capital to build without external financing. The choice of financing partner shapes almost everything downstream: which contractor wins, which technology platform is used, which terms govern repayment.
World Bank / IMF
Western multilateral institutions have been largely absent from new megacity projects specifically — their conditions around procurement transparency and environmental standards make them slower and less preferred by governments wanting to move fast. They remain significant in sectoral financing (health, education) but are not the primary players in the city-building wave.
⚡ Reality Check — Does Foreign-Built Infrastructure Benefit Ordinary Africans?
The record is genuinely mixed — and depends heavily on the specific project and governance framework.
A Chinese-built road that connects a farming community to a market creates real economic benefit. A Chinese-built government tower in an empty desert city does not, at least not directly. The question to ask of every infrastructure project is not who built it or who financed it — those are second-order questions. The first-order question is: what problem does this solve for which people, and does the evidence suggest this is the most effective way to solve it? Foreign-financed infrastructure in Africa has a mixed record because it answers that question inconsistently. Some projects are genuinely transformative. Others serve the political needs of the government commissioning them or the commercial needs of the contractor building them more than the population that will nominally benefit.
Governance and Social Structure
Who Decides, Who Is Displaced, Who Moves In
The governance story around African new cities is uncomfortable and worth stating plainly — though with the caveat that documentation varies significantly across projects, and evidence is stronger for some cases than others.
Public consultation appears to have been limited in most major new city projects, based on available civil society reporting, academic urban studies, and investigative journalism. Egypt's New Administrative Capital was announced as presidential policy with no documented public deliberation phase. Independent urban researchers including those at the African Centre for Cities have noted the absence of community input in Senegal's Diamniadio process. Eko Atlantic proceeded under Lagos state approval with minimal recorded public engagement. The speed and scale of these announcements were, in many cases, features rather than bugs — designed to create momentum that would be hard to reverse through normal democratic processes.
Displacement Without Acknowledgment
When land is cleared for a new city, people are already living on it. Farmers, informal settlers, small communities. The land acquisition processes around most African new city projects have been poorly documented, poorly compensated, and in some cases actively concealed in official narratives that describe the building sites as "empty" or "undeveloped." This language does real harm. Land that appears undeveloped to a satellite image often has deep community and agricultural use that maps at a different scale.
The Abuja model is instructive here. Nigeria's capital move from Lagos to Abuja displaced tens of thousands of people from the Federal Capital Territory — a displacement that was never fully acknowledged or compensated in the decades that followed. New city projects that followed Abuja's model inherited this structural problem.
The Affordability Question
Who can afford to live in these new cities? The answer, consistently, is not the urban poor who most urgently need better housing. Egypt's New Administrative Capital apartments sell at prices accessible only to the upper-middle and upper class — the same demographic that can already navigate Cairo reasonably well. Eko Atlantic is explicitly an elite enclave. Konza was designed for a tech-worker class that does not yet exist in sufficient numbers in Kenya.
The gap between stated purpose ("a modern city for our growing population") and actual function (a prestige address for the affluent, a government showcase, or a monument to a president's legacy) is the central political failure of most of these projects. It is not that cities for the wealthy are wrong in themselves. It is that they are being presented as solutions to the housing and infrastructure crisis affecting the majority.
| Project |
Who Can Afford It |
Displacement Record |
Consultation Process |
| Egypt New Capital |
Upper-middle class and above; government employees relocating under directive |
Limited public documentation; desert location minimised direct displacement |
None publicly documented; presidential decision |
| Eko Atlantic |
International business class, wealthy Nigerian elite |
Ocean reclamation displaced fishing communities from coastline access |
Lagos state approval; minimal public process |
| Diamniadio |
Middle class; some affordable housing included but limited |
Agricultural land acquisition with contested compensation |
Presidential initiative; limited civil society input |
| Tatu City |
Middle class upward; industrial workers in SEZ zones |
Private land purchase; some community negotiation reported |
Private developer; county government approval |
| Konza Technopolis |
Tech workers, future knowledge economy employees |
Pastoral Maasai land use affected; contested |
Government-led; environmental review conducted |
Why Some May Succeed
The Conditions That Actually Produce Functional Cities
Not every new city is failing. And even the ones that have struggled so far are not necessarily permanent failures — cities take generations to fill. What distinguishes the projects most likely to succeed has less to do with architectural ambition and more to do with a few specific structural conditions.
Economic Anchor Before Residents
The new cities that show the most organic growth are the ones that established an economic reason to be there before building housing. Tatu City built factories and a special economic zone first. Hawassa built an industrial park first. The workers followed the jobs. Projects that built towers first and then hoped businesses would appear are consistently emptier.
Physical Connectivity to Existing Urban Systems
Diamniadio has an airport and road access to Dakar. Egypt's New Capital has a high-speed rail connection under construction to Cairo. These links matter enormously. A new city that is genuinely isolated from the existing labour market, consumer base, and social networks is asking people to abandon their entire lives, not just move house. Most people will not do that unless the offer is extraordinary. Connectivity turns a new city into an extension of an existing one — which is both less symbolically dramatic and more practically successful.
Government Mandate with Genuine Institutional Capacity
When a government physically moves its ministries and civil servants to a new city, it creates a guaranteed initial population and economic base. Egypt's relocation of government offices to the New Administrative Capital — even if incomplete and contested — gives the city a nucleus that purely commercial projects lack. Nigeria's Abuja, for all its problems, worked in this sense: mandatory government relocation created a functional, if deeply unequal, city.
Fracture Points
Why Many of These Projects Are More Fragile Than They Appear
The Debt Trajectory
Several countries financing new city projects are doing so against already-stressed sovereign balance sheets. Egypt's foreign debt burden, Zambia's debt restructuring, Ethiopia's ongoing fiscal pressures — the macroeconomic context in which these cities are being built is not favourable. A city that takes 20–30 years to reach full occupancy requires sustained financing over that entire period. If sovereign debt conditions deteriorate and foreign lenders reduce exposure, construction stops, investor confidence collapses, and the partly-built city becomes a liability rather than an asset.
Climate Exposure
Several new city sites have significant climate vulnerability that appears to be underweighted in the planning. Egypt's New Capital is in a desert with severe water stress. Eko Atlantic is built on reclaimed land adjacent to a coastline expected to face increased storm surge under climate projections. Coastal West African cities generally face flooding risk. Building expensive, permanent infrastructure in locations that may be significantly harder to inhabit in 50 years is a systemic planning failure that will be expensive to correct.
Political Fragility
New city projects are closely associated with specific administrations. When those administrations change — through elections, coups, or popular pressure — the political will to continue and fund them can evaporate. Several African new city projects have already been effectively paused or deprioritised following changes in government. A project that requires 20 years of continuous political commitment in a context of frequent leadership change faces inherent structural risk that architectural renders do not capture.
The Ghost City Risk
China has its own experience with this problem. Dozens of Chinese new cities and economic zones built in the 2000s and 2010s remained largely unoccupied for years — some permanently. The infrastructure existed but the organic demand did not materialise. African governments are building new cities partly by referencing Chinese urban development as a model. They are not always examining China's ghost city failures with equal attention.
Counterargument
Why Governments Keep Building Them Anyway — And Why That Is Not Irrational
A fair reading of this article so far could conclude that African new city projects are mostly vanity exercises by authoritarian-leaning governments funded by debt traps and harmful to ordinary people. That would be an oversimplification. The case for building new cities is not as weak as a catalogue of failures makes it look.
The Existing Capital Problem Is Genuinely Unsolvable at Scale
Reforming Lagos is not a technical problem with a technical solution. Lagos grew organically, informally, and at extraordinary speed over sixty years. Its road network, land tenure system, drainage infrastructure, and utility grid were not designed together — they accreted. Untangling them to build a functional modern city on top of the existing chaos would cost at least as much as building a new city, would displace at least as many people, and would be politically harder because every intervention touches existing vested interests. The blank-slate argument for new cities is not naive. It reflects a genuine constraint.
The Signal Value to Foreign Investors Is Real
One of the consistent findings in development economics is that foreign direct investment flows toward perceived stability and modernity. A gleaming new government district with reliable power, modern roads, and functioning internet signals to investors that a country is a viable operating environment. Whether that signal is accurate is a separate question from whether it works. Egypt's New Administrative Capital has attracted Gulf and Chinese investors partly because the physical environment communicates a seriousness of purpose that the older Cairo government district does not. The signal is a real economic asset, even if the city itself remains partly empty.
African Populations Are Young and Growing Fast
The median age in sub-Saharan Africa is around 18 years. The population is projected to double by 2050. The people who will fill these cities over the next 30 years are currently children or not yet born. Projects that look premature and empty in 2024 may look prescient in 2045 if population projections hold. Seoul, now one of the world's major cities, was reconstructed from near-total destruction in the 1950s on a timeline that would have looked absurd in 1953. Chandigarh and Brasilia, both purpose-built capitals initially criticised as disconnected from reality, eventually developed functioning urban economies. New cities have a long time horizon that short-term assessment tends to underweight.
Some Projects Are Already Delivering
Tatu City is generating manufacturing employment in Kenya. The Hawassa Industrial Park — whatever its governance flaws — employed approximately 22,000–28,000 workers as of 2023–2024 according to ILO and LSE Africa research, in a region with limited formal employment. Diamniadio's airport infrastructure improved logistics for the broader Dakar economy. The complete-failure narrative, applied uniformly, misses genuine partial successes.
⚡ Reality Check — Is the Criticism of New African Cities Partly a Western Framing?
This is a fair question and deserves a direct answer.
Several urban scholars — including some African researchers writing in journals like Urban Studies and the Journal of Urban Affairs — have noted that the criticism of African new city projects is often harsher than the criticism applied to equivalent projects in East Asia or the Gulf, where new city construction has been treated as modernisation. Dubai was built in the desert. Singapore was a swamp. Shenzhen was a village. The double standard in how "ghost city" concerns are applied to African projects versus Southeast Asian ones is worth naming. That said, acknowledging the double standard does not resolve the legitimate concerns about displacement, debt, and affordability that are specific to the African context and backed by documented evidence. Both things can be true: the criticism can be partly unfair in its framing and the concerns can still be substantively valid.
Lessons for Modern Society
What These Cities Are Actually Teaching Us
Lesson 01
Infrastructure Is Political
Every new city encodes a set of choices about who matters and who does not. The choice of site, the affordability of housing, the connectivity to existing communities, the displacement processes used — all of these are political decisions wearing architectural clothing. Treating city-building as a technical challenge misses this entirely.
Lesson 02
Debt Is Not Neutral
The terms of infrastructure financing shape the politics of infrastructure operation. A city built with Chinese financing, by Chinese contractors, on Chinese technology platforms creates a form of dependency that persists long after the ribbon-cutting. This does not make Chinese financing categorically bad — but it makes the choice of financing partner a strategic decision, not an administrative one.
Lesson 03
Cities Grow From Economics, Not Aesthetics
Spectacular architecture and master plans do not produce thriving cities. Jobs, transport, affordable housing, and organic social networks do. The new city projects most likely to succeed are those that recognised this and built economic anchors first. The ones least likely to succeed built the skyline first and hoped the economy would follow.
Lesson 04
The People Most Affected Are Rarely Asked
This is a pattern that predates current projects by centuries — cities planned for populations rather than with them. The displacement, the unaffordability, the disconnection from existing communities all follow from treating urban planning as a technical exercise conducted by experts for beneficiaries who are assumed rather than consulted. Participation is not just an ethical requirement. Cities that ignore local knowledge tend to build the wrong things.
Lesson 05
Old Capitals Need Investment Too
The political energy and capital flowing into new city projects is largely not flowing into the existing cities where the majority of the population actually lives. Improving Lagos's infrastructure, expanding Nairobi's transit, upgrading Accra's water systems — these would reach far more people with immediate effect. New cities are not necessarily wrong, but the opportunity cost of the capital they absorb is real and rarely accounted for honestly.
Lesson 06
The Abuja Warning
Nigeria's 1991 capital move to Abuja is the longest-running African experiment in new capital cities, and its lessons are sobering. Abuja became a functional political capital and a showcase city — and also one of the most unequal cities in Africa, where satellite slums house the workers who maintain the gleaming centre but cannot afford to live in it. That pattern is visible in embryonic form in almost every new African city project. It is not a bug. It is the likely outcome of the current design logic.
None of this means the new city projects are simple failures. The genuine urbanisation pressure is real. The inadequacy of existing infrastructure is real. The need for new thinking about African cities is real. What is being questioned here is not the ambition but the specific design decisions — about financing, governance, affordability, and consultation — that are determining who those cities will serve.
Conclusion
Cities Built in the Image of Power, Not the Needs of People
The new megacity projects across Africa are a genuine phenomenon — ambitious, expensive, geopolitically loaded, and deeply uneven in their likely outcomes. They are not propaganda, but they are also not the solutions to African urban challenges that their promotional materials claim.
The honest assessment is that Africa needs more urban capacity, not all of it in the form of prestige new capitals. It needs housing that its existing urban populations can afford, infrastructure in the cities where people already live, and urban planning processes that treat communities as participants rather than obstacles. The new city wave delivers some of that, inconsistently, at enormous cost and with significant geopolitical strings attached.
What the new cities do reveal, quite clearly, is who holds power in African urban development: central governments, Chinese SOEs, Gulf sovereign wealth funds, and private developers with access to international capital. Not the Lagos market trader. Not the Nairobi informal settler. Not the Ethiopian farm community displaced for an industrial park. The cities are being built by and for a specific set of interests, even when they are rhetorically presented as national projects for everyone.
Whether this pattern changes depends less on architectural innovation and more on whether African civil societies, urban planners, and governance reformers can insert different values — participation, affordability, climate resilience, and equitable land access — into the planning processes that currently exclude them. The buildings are going up either way. The question is what social contract they encode.
Abuja took thirty years to become what it is. Egypt's New Capital will take at least as long. The cities being designed now are the cities that will shape African urban life in the 2050s and 2060s. The decisions being made in the next decade matter far more than the promotional renders suggest.
Sources & Further Reading
References
Numbers and claims in this article are drawn from the sources below. Where figures vary across sources, the article uses the most widely cited estimate and notes the range where significant disagreement exists.
United Nations DESA
World Urbanization Prospects 2025 & World Population Prospects 2024
Primary source for Africa urban population figures and projections. Urban population ~700M in 2024, projected growth to ~1.5B by 2050. population.un.org
World Bank
Lagos Diagnostic Study and Pathway for Transformation (2023)
Source for Lagos population range (13–27 million) and 3.2% annual growth rate. Also source for Hawassa Industrial Park community impact evaluation. documents1.worldbank.org
African Business Magazine
Can Egypt's New Administrative Capital Defy the Sceptics? (July 2025)
Source for $58 billion total cost estimate, government occupancy data, and current status of Egypt's New Administrative Capital. african.business
LSE Africa at LSE / ILO
Ethiopia's Industrial Parks: Employment Precarity and Disrupted Production (2024); ILO Gendered Employment Analysis Ethiopia (2023)
Source for Hawassa employment figures (22,000–28,000 workers as of 2023–2024), wage conditions, and worker experience data. blogs.lse.ac.uk; ilo.org
Deborah Brautigam / Johns Hopkins SAIS-CARI
Debt Trap Diplomacy: Examining the Evidence (China Africa Research Initiative)
Basis for the nuanced assessment of Chinese debt in Africa — specifically the finding that asset seizure claims are not well-supported by documented cases. sais-cari.org
African Centre for Cities / Urban Studies
New Cities in Africa: Catalysts or Ghost Towns? — Various researchers, 2018–2023
Academic framing for the governance and consultation gaps in African new city projects, including Diamniadio and Eko Atlantic case studies. africancentreforcities.net
CNN / Egypt Independent
Egypt's New Administrative Capital: A New City Is Rising (CNN, March 2024); New Administrative Capital Costs (Egypt Independent, 2020)
Source for Phase 1 cost (~$10.6 billion), current resident numbers (1,500–10,000 families), and government employee relocation (48,000 civil servants). edition.cnn.com
Note: Population figures for African cities vary significantly across sources due to differences in boundary definitions, census methodology, and data recency. Where ranges are given, the article uses the most conservative defensible estimate and notes disagreement. Cost figures for infrastructure projects in the region should be treated as estimates; final costs frequently differ from projections.
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